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PREFACE
PUblIC FINANCE IN POST-CONFlICT 
ENvIRONMENTS: A POlICY PAPER SERIES
In the wake of violent conflict, a key element of building 
a durable peace is building a state with the ability to 
collect and manage public resources. To implement 
peace accords and to provide public services, the 
government must be able to collect revenue, allocate 
resources, and manage expenditure in a manner that is 
regarded by its citizens as effective and equitable. 
The tasks of revenue mobilization, budget allocation, 
and expenditure management are bound together 
by political imperatives as well as economic logic. To 
collect revenues, the state must be seen as legitimate 
in the eyes of its citizens. and to secure legitimacy, the 
state must allocate resources and manage expenditure 
effectively and equitably. 
The need to build legitimate and capable states in war-
torn societies is now widely recognized. The Principles 
for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, 
adopted by the development ministers of major donor 
countries in March 2005, declares that statebuilding is 
‘the central objective.’ This represents a striking break 
from the prevailing wisdom in the closing decades of 
the 20th century, when the state was widely regarded as 
the problem. The state has been rediscovered: it is now 
invoked as the solution. The policy rhetoric has changed 
from downsizing states to building state capacity. 
Yet little systematic work has been done on what 
the international community can and should do to 
strengthen the capacities of post-war states to mobilize, 
allocate, and spend public resources.  
This policy paper series, jointly published by the 
Center on International Cooperation (CIC) at new York 
University and the political economy research Institute 
(perI) at the University of Massachusetts,  amherst, 
seeks to redress this gap by presenting innovative 
policy proposals targeting critical issues in postwar 
public finance. 
Building state capacities in public finance is crucial to 
the success of peacebuilding efforts for three reasons: 
First, governments must be able to ensure  »
sustainable funding for new democratic 
institutions, for social programs that ease tensions 
and redress grievances, and for public investments 
to promote economic growth and development. In 
the early post-war years, countries often receive a 
large influx of external assistance that temporarily 
can meet some of these needs. But aid typically 
diminishes over time, so domestic resources 
are necessary to sustain these institutions and 
programs. a key challenge is to ensure that aid 
does not ‘crowd out’ domestic fiscal capacities, but 
instead stimulates their growth.
Second, fiscal capacities are needed to build a  »
legitimate state. Democratic elections do not, in 
and of themselves, ensure state legitimacy. neither 
do ‘quick impact projects’ in which international 
aid agencies seek to fill urgent needs. legitimacy 
comes in large part from government delivery of 
services that people need and want. elections 
provide an avenue for the citizenry to voice 
demands; responding to those demands requires 
the capacity to mobilize, allocate, and spend public 
resources effectively.
Third, in some cases there is a need to curtail extra- »
legal taxation by ‘warlords’ and armed groups so as 
to enhance security. In afghanistan, for example, 
control of border customs outposts is not only a 
fiscal issue but also a security issue. Similarly, control 
over revenues from natural-resource extraction, 
such as logging in Cambodia or diamonds in West 
africa, is often crucial for establishing the state’s 
monopoly not only in legitimate taxation but also 
in legitimate force. at the same time, domestic fiscal 
capacity is the only sustainable source of financing 
for public security after external peacekeepers 
have withdrawn.
The papers in this series offer policy proposals designed 
to strengthen the fiscal dimension of statebuilding. 
The authors draw on extensive personal experience 
in public finance matters in war-torn societies, and 
on lessons from comparative studies, including Peace 
and the Public Purse: Economic Policies for Postwar 
Statebuilding (Boulder: lynne rienner, 2007), the 
outcome of the first stage of the CIC’s statebuilding 
project.  after a concise recapitulation of the problems 
to be addressed, the authors concentrate on proposing 
solutions that can be practically implemented. 
We hope these policy papers will find a wide audience 
amongst those who are grappling with the difficult 
challenges of post-war reconstruction, and that the 
proposals they put forward will assist in the twin tasks 
of building legitimate and effective states and building 
a durable peace. 
JaMeS K. BoYCe 
Lead economist, Peacebuilding as Statebuilding Program
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RIGHT-FINANCING 
SECURITY SECTOR 
REFORM 
EXECUTIvE SUMMARY
Security sector reform (SSr) in weak and fragile 
state environments encompasses a broad range 
of efforts to improve the capacity, governance, 
performance, and sustainability of the security 
system. Financial dimensions of SSr include the 
allocation of resources according to well-defined 
priorities, both across sectors and within the 
security system, and ensuring that expenditure 
is transparent, efficient and effective. Issues of 
financial management were central to the origins 
of SSr in the 1990s, and they are no less central 
to security sector reform today. Yet current SSr 
strategies and programming all too often pay 
insufficient attention to public finance issues. 
as a result, the medium and long-term fiscal 
implications of short-run policy decisions are 
not factored into early post-conflict engagement 
processes. The negative consequences include 
unsustainable reforms, the squeezing out of other 
vital sectors, and, conversely, the under-provision 
of security. 
This paper argues for the “right-financing” 
approach to be adopted for the security sector – 
striking an appropriate balance between current 
security needs and the goal of building a fiscally 
sustainable security sector based on realistic 
resource projections. This paper makes four policy 
proposals:
1. bUIlD FISCAl DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY 
INTO PEACE AGREEMENTS, POST-CONFlICT 
NEEDS ASSESSMENTS, DEvElOPMENT 
STRATEGIES, AND EXPENDITURE PlANNING
long-term fiscal sustainability is strongly 
influenced by early decisions. Bringing right-
financing considerations to the negotiating table 
can minimize the problems caused by fiscally 
blind security policies. peace agreements should 
acknowledge that size targets for the security 
sector are subject to fiscal constraints, and 
therefore tentative. Including the security sector in 
initial post-conflict needs assessments – the main 
tool used by donors for assessing reconstruction 
costs and needs – would promote mainstreaming 
of SSr into wider development strategies, rather 
than treating the sector as “stand-alone.” In the 
immediate aftermath of violent conflict, provisional 
macro-fiscal forecasts, developed with the help of 
the international financial institutions (IFIs), would 
assist security sector planners in prioritizing and 
making sustainable force size and composition 
decisions, while also informing donor decisions 
related to the establishment and phasing out of 
trust funds.
2. AlIGN SHORT-RUN SECURITY POlICY 
PRIORITIES AND SPENDING DECISIONS 
WITH lONG TERM NATIONAl bUDGETARY 
AND POlITICAl REAlITIES.
The budget ought to be the primary tool of policy, 
and security sector reform should be funded in a 
balanced and fiscally sensitive manner. at present, 
such decisions are often instead made on the basis 
of short-term national and international priorities. 
SSr assessment should consider the short, medium, 
and long-term security and fiscal impacts of 
different force sizes, functions, and pay and grading 
options. Trust funds established by donors to 
support payment of police or military staff where 
state revenues remain insufficient should include 
clear “exit strategies” for an orderly transition to 
a normal budgetary process. In assessing security 
needs, the orientation of the security sector has 
direct implications for how priorities, targets, 
and financing mechanisms are determined. a key 
question guiding policy must be, “security for 
whom?” The size, structure, and function of the 
security, law and order and justice system ought 
to be transformed based on public demand, rather 
than simply supply. non-state systems – including 
traditional and customary security and justice 
providers – are often more effective, accessible, 
legitimate, and cheaper than the formal security 
sector. at a particular moment and in a given 
context, these institutions might serve as viable 
alternatives to state forces. 
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3. MOvE TO A SERvICE DElIvERY MODEl 
FOR THE SECURITY SECTOR
Service delivery benchmarks are commonly 
set for sectors such as health, education and 
transport, but not for the security sector. There 
is a paucity of reliable, valid metrics to discern 
whether progress is being made towards building 
capable and efficient security apparatuses, and to 
assess the performance outcomes of budgetary 
resources towards security ends. Benchmarks 
should reflect the transition of the security sector 
from an emphasis on combating “enemies of the 
state,” towards providing law and order and justice 
services to citizens. policy innovations that are 
needed to address this fundamental weakness 
include: (i) collaboration among multilateral and 
bilateral actors to establish model security sector 
delivery benchmarks that can be used in the SSr 
review process; (ii) developing standard unit 
costs for services delivered in given contexts; and 
(iii) integrating these benchmarks into annual 
budget exercises and medium-term expenditure 
frameworks. To support movement towards a 
service delivery model for the security sector, 
the Development assistance Committee of the 
organization for economic Cooperation and 
Development (oeCD/DaC), in collaboration with 
the Un and IFIs, should establish a standard set 
of objectively verifiable indicators and means of 
verification.
4. STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAl CAPACITIES 
TO SUPPORT RIGHT-FINANCING
To strengthen the assessment of security systems, 
policy makers should consider establishing a pool 
of expertise across international organizations 
and bilateral agencies. This pool should include 
fiscal, public finance, public sector restructuring, 
aid management, SSr, and revenue experts. To 
strengthen SSr implementation, policy makers 
should: (i) actively promote the migration of public 
sector reform and financial management experts 
to the civilian components of the ministries of 
defense, interior, policing, and justice entities; 
(ii) conduct a multi-agency assessment of the 
comparative advantages of different Un, IFIs, and 
bilateral agencies to support SSr; (iii) develop 
support operations to strengthen the role of 
ministries of finance in security sector budgetary 
processes; and (iv) mainstream procurement 
arrangements for the sector to maximize 
accountability and minimize corruption. 
The proposals advanced here are intended to 
improve the quantity, quality, and sustainability 
of security services, benefiting the international 
community and their taxpayers, as well as 
recipient governments and most importantly 
their citizens. as post-conflict states struggle to 
gain traction towards creating a virtuous cycle, 
in which security promotes economic growth 
and political stability, and vice versa, issues of 
scale, prioritization, effectiveness and efficiency 
become fundamental to the delivery of security 
services. The aim is to build responsive security 
capacities without forcing governments into a 
fiscal abyss thereby mortgaging the government’s 
future. If sustainable solutions are to be found for 
the problems of statebuilding, right-financing the 
security sector is a necessity.
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RIGHT-FINANCING 
SECURITY SECTOR 
REFORM  
PETER MIDDlEbROOK AND GORDON PEAKE1 
Insecurity costs. Without security, many states 
risk remaining weak and fragile states. Insecurity 
hinders economic growth, exacerbates poverty, 
cultivates fear among citizens, and presents 
significant challenges for democratic governance. 
attempts to arrest insecurity strain government 
resources and redirect them from more 
economically productive ends.2  
as a result, improving security – for the state and 
for its citizens - is emerging as a top priority of the 
international state-building agenda in countries 
as diverse and demanding as afghanistan, Sierra 
leone, and Timor-leste.3  perhaps nowhere is this 
more necessary than in post-conflict environments, 
where reestablishing sustainable, legitimate 
security is essential to wider social and economic 
recovery efforts.
The concept of right-financing for the security 
sector “involves the determination of sustainable 
policies and strategies, institutions and service 
delivery capacities that balance security, 
governance, service quality and fiscal sustainability 
concerns in weak and fragile states.”4 right-
1 peter Middlebrook, formerly an economist with the World Bank, is 
co-founder and director of Middlebrook & Miller, a firm specializing in 
international finance, economic development and post-conflict reconstruction. 
Middlebrook is the originator of the term and developed the concept of “right-
financing.” Gordon peake is a Senior associate with libra advisory Group, a 
security and justice reform consultancy based in london. The authors would 
like to thank louise andersen, nicole Ball, James K. Boyce, rahul Chandran, 
Mark Downes, and Jake Sherman for their comments and suggestions.
2 Violence in latin america – the region in which its costs have been most 
frequently quantified – imposes an estimated annual cost of US$15 billion in lost 
wealth and income, representing anywhere between 5 and 25 percent or more of 
counties’ gross domestic product (GDp) in particular years. See erik alda, Mayra 
Buvinic, and Jorge lamas, “neighbourhood peacekeeping: The Inter-american 
Development Bank’s Violence reduction programs in Colombia and Uruguay,” 
Civil Wars, Vol. 8, no. 2, (2006), p. 200.
3 Increased attention to security as a governance issue has been accompanied 
by a parallel focus, following September 11, 2001, on “hard” security issues related 
to counter-terrorism. These goals are often conflictual.
4 Middlebrook p, J, “Right-financing the Future: Lessons for Asian and 
European Peace Processes”, Asia Europe Journal, Vol. 6.  no. 1, Springer Verlag 
(2008).
financing is therefore essentially about determining 
an acceptable trade-off between “right-sizing” 
security forces and higher-quality and more 
equitable security services over time.5 
“Security sector reform” (SSr) is the term used to 
describe programs adopted by governments with 
the support of international partners to achieve 
professional security institutions that meet the 
needs of citizens, society, and the state and which 
operate within the rule of law and under effective 
democratic control.6  addressing the wide range 
of state institutions with a formal mandate to 
ensure the safety and security of the state and 
its citizens, SSr’s goals are both immediate and 
long-term. In the short-term, it is intended to 
improve the ability of a country’s military, police, 
justice and intelligence organizations to provide 
basic and equitable security. Its long-term aims, 
however, are much more ambitious: to ensure that 
security institutions serve the interests of society 
as a whole, rather than those of a political elite 
or grouping. This involves radical changes to the 
management, purpose, structure, financing and 
values of security organizations.
providing security has its costs as well as benefits. 
In post-conflict settings, these costs are often 
unavoidably high. For this reason, issues of financial 
management are central to security sector reform. 
Yet in the majority of cases, the medium and 
long-term fiscal implications of short-run policy 
decisions have not been factored sufficiently into 
early post-conflict engagement processes. on 
one hand, national fiscal capacities are frequently 
overlooked by donors when making security sector 
assistance decisions. all too often, donors burden 
states with security sectors they cannot afford, and 
5 oeCD/DaC, Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security 
and Justice, (paris: oeCD, 2007), p. 75.  available at www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/
if-ssr
6 M. Caparini, “Security Sector reform and naTo and eU enlargement,” SIPRI 
Yearbook 2003, cited in Gordon peake and eric Scheye, “To arrest Insecurity: 
Time for a revised Security Sector reform agenda,” Conflict, Security, and 
Development, Vol. 5, no. 3, (2005), p. 299.
SSr’s goals are both immediate 
and long-term.
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at the same time effectively mortgage their own 
aid budgets to supporting them in the medium to 
long term. Weak government revenues coupled 
with significant external support to state security 
institutions breeds aid dependency. What revenue 
the state is able to generate is disproportionately 
allocated to security institutions at the expense 
of other, vital needs. This “live now, pay later” 
approach to SSr risks, over the medium to long-
term, undermining the very statebuilding process 
it is meant to support. on the other hand, too 
great a focus on existing revenue constraints could 
lead to the under-provision of security, as fixed 
non-service delivery costs are often funded first. 
Without financing immediate defence, policing, 
correctional, and justice needs, the “buy only what 
you can afford” approach risks the statebuilding 
process in the short term. 
Fiscal sustainability and the provision of adequate 
security cannot both be achieved at the same 
time in countries such as afghanistan, Kosovo or 
Sierra leone. existing revenue constraints would 
lead to the under-provision of security, since fixed 
non-service delivery costs are often funded first. 
rather, a middle approach that moves towards a 
fiscally sustainable path sequentially, trading off 
fiscal capacities with actual needs is required.
To address cost efficiency and sustainability issues, 
the “right-financing” approach should be adopted 
by both security and development institutions.7 
right-financing is about finding an acceptable 
balance between the size (and composition) of the 
security sector required by current circumstances 
– “right-sizing” – and achieving fiscally sustainable 
security sector expenditure over time based 
on honest appraisal of resource projections. 
Determining sustainable levels minimizes risks 
associated with future under-funding of security 
due to financial constraints, including the risk 
of overly stringent application of fiscal policy 
conditionalities by IFIs.8 at the same time, it 
decreases the likelihood of expansionary security 
policies that crowd out other public spending 
and push back opportunities for early exit by the 
international community. 
7 Middlebrook (2008).
8 oeCD/DaC, Handbook on Security System Reform, p. 75.
This paper outlines what a right-financing 
approach looks like, why it is beneficial, and how it 
can be achieved through existing institutions with 
enhanced collaboration, established tools, and new 
measures. The paper begins with a brief overview 
of the public finance origins of SSr. We then 
offer four sets of recommendations based on the 
right-financing approach. The first is that security 
should become a normalized element of the state-
building agenda, integrated into peace agreements, 
post-conflict needs assessments, development 
strategies, and expenditure planning. The second 
set resolves around aligning the security sector 
with budgetary and political realities. The third set 
focuses on adopting a “service delivery” model for 
security. The fourth relates to capacity building and 
good management in both national governments 
and the international organizations that assist 
them.  
THE DEvElOPMENT OF THE SSR CONCEPT
It is now accepted wisdom that security and 
development are inter-linked and mutually 
reinforcing. The policy justification for SSr is 
that a security sector that is effective, efficient, 
equitable, accountable and sustainable is an 
essential precondition for creating an enabling 
environment for wider economic, social and 
political development. The expanding roster of 
actors engaged in SSr attests to the importance 
attached to it as a tool for development and 
conflict management. 
The organization for economic Cooperation 
and Development’s Development assistance 
Committee (oeCD/DaC) has been the institutional 
locus for much SSr policy development. Its 
definition of the “security system”9  indicates both 
the breadth of vision in SSr and the scale of the 
task that confronts would-be reformers:
Core security actors: »  armed forces; police 
service; gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; 
presidential guards; intelligence and security 
services (both military and civilian); coast 
guards; border guards; customs authorities; and 
9 The oeCD/DaC uses the phrase “security system” instead of “security sector.”
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reserve or local security units (civil defense 
forces, national guards, militias). 
Management and oversight bodies:  » the 
executive, national security advisory bodies, 
legislative and legislative select committees; 
ministries of defense, internal affairs, foreign 
affairs; customary and traditional authorities; 
financial management bodies (finance 
ministries, budget officers, financial audit and 
planning units); and civil society organizations 
(civilian review boards and public complaints 
commissions). 
Justice and the rule of  law:  » judiciary and justice 
ministries; prisons; criminal investigation 
and prosecution services; human rights 
commissions and ombudsmen; and customary 
and traditional justice systems. 
Non-statutory security forces: »  liberation 
armies, guerrilla armies, private security 
companies, and political party militias.10 
SSr encompasses a broad range of methods to 
improve the capacity, governance, performance, and 
sustainability of the sector. These include retraining 
police, reforming penal systems, restructuring 
military and intelligence organizations, creating 
or strengthening internal and external oversight 
and accountability mechanisms, and building 
organizational capacity. In post-conflict situations, 
SSr is also linked closely with demobilization, 
disarmament, and reintegration (DDr).
Financial aspects of the security sector are 
acknowledged in the oeCD/DaC definition, 
under the rubric of management and oversight 
structures. Financial dimensions of SSr include 
allocating resources according to priorities, both 
across sectors and within the security sector, 
and ensuring that expenditure is transparent. But 
an examination of both SSr literature and SSr 
programs reveals that, in practice, this has been a 
curiously neglected topic.
10 oeCD/DaC, Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security 
and Justice, (paris: oeCD, 2007), p. 22. available at www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/
if-ssr
This lacuna is odd in two respects. Firstly, it 
ignores the doctrine’s own intellectual lineage: 
the roots of SSr lie in discussions and debates 
in the mid-1990s as to how best to “down-size,” 
or “right-size,” state military structures in eastern 
europe. Much of the early writing on SSr had a 
clear financial focus, dealing with expenditure 
reviews, off-budget expenditure and accounting 
best practice.11 Secondly, current SSr policy and 
programming remains largely oblivious to the 
real-world relevance of public finance issues and 
the consequences that ensue when these are 
insufficiently considered.
The negative consequences of this neglect – 
unsustainable reforms, under-provision of security, 
and the squeezing out of other vital sectors – are 
belatedly beginning to drive greater attention to 
the public finance aspects of security. There seems 
to be growing willingness by donors to adopt 
whole-of-government approaches and to cooperate 
among themselves.  But moving from stove-piped 
decision-making to integrated policy requires 
attention to more than the “3Ds” of development, 
defence, and diplomacy: it must also include 
finance ministries and funding instruments. In the 
words of a recent study on reform in post-conflict 
states, “money matters.” 12
The four proposals that follow lay out the 
foundations for a right-financing approach to the 
fiscal dimensions of security that is designed to 
contribute to sustainable, long-term stability and 
development.
11 nicole Ball, “addressing Military expenditures and Military roles in 
Developing Countries: a review of Members’ approaches,” paper prepared 
for the Information DaC Task Force on Conflict, peace and Development 
Cooperation, 1998; Dylan hendrickson and nicole Ball, “Good practice and 
Working principles in Security System reform,” report produced for the oeCD 
DaC network on Conflict, peace and Development Cooperation, 2003; andrew 
Cottey and anthony Forster, Reshaping Defence: New Roles for Military 
Cooperation and Assistance, adelphi paper no. 365, (london, IISS, 2004).
12 Stewart patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater than the Sum of its Parts: 
Accessing “Whole of Government” Approaches to Fragile States, (new York: 
International peace academy, 2007), p. 8.
Financial dimensions of SSr have 
been a curiously neglected topic.
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PROPOSAl 1: bUIlD SECURITY INTO PEACE 
AGREEMENTS, POST-CONFlICT NEEDS 
ASSESSMENTS, DEvElOPMENT STRATEGIES, 
AND EXPENDITURE PlANNING
For the security sector to reach a sustainable 
form, size, and function, best practice suggests 
that reform must be based on an overall 
national vision, a national threat assessment, 
a security environment analysis, a SSr review, 
and the provisional fiscal framework. In post-
conflict countries, the foundation for these 
processes is determined in large measure by the 
political settlement and subsequent transitional 
arrangements. The interests of informal networks 
within security institutions often run counter to 
the trajectory of reforms proposed by outsiders. 
all too often, force establishment decisions gain 
political buy-in prior to any assessment of the 
implications of their recurrent or capital costs. 
as a result, agreed political commitments can 
be financially unattainable, necessitating ad hoc, 
mid-course, downward revisions. Since the 1999 
lomé accord, for example, the size of the army in 
Sierra leone has been decreased due to financial 
realities from 17,000 to 10,500 troops – and may 
be further cut to 8,500 in the medium term. The 
ad hoc approach to planning that yields such 
unrealistic force sizes is inefficient and wasteful, 
diverting limited financial resources from other 
development priorities.
Fiscal sustainability for security forces is a long-
term issue, but its prospects for success are 
influenced by early decisions. For this reason, 
a right-financing approach should start with 
peace agreements. These provide the road map 
for political normalization, the establishment 
of transitional authority and the strengthening 
of public administration, as well as for the 
demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration 
of former combatants, and the transformation 
of security institutions. Bringing right-financing 
considerations to the negotiating table can 
minimize the problems caused by fiscally blind 
security policies. peace agreements should indicate 
that size targets for the security sector are subject 
to fiscal constraints, and therefore tentative.
a right-financing approach also means including 
security in multilateral planning processes. a post-
conflict needs assessment (pCna) is the main tool 
used by donors for assessing the reconstruction 
costs and needs. however, security is often not 
addressed in these “comprehensive” assessments, 
remaining the purview of police and military 
“experts” outside the process. This has resulted 
in oversized security sectors that the state can ill 
afford. The 2001 afghanistan reconstruction needs 
assessment, for example, underestimated the level 
of security expenditure required, while at the 
same time factoring in security improvements that 
did not materialize.13  as a result, the 2002 donors’ 
conference in Tokyo did not raise adequate funds 
for security, a problem that has been addressed 
only as afghanistan’s security has deteriorated.
Joint assessments that incorporate the security 
sector are advocated by both the new oeCD 
Implementation Framework for SSr and the 
proposed Un/World Bank draft guidelines for 
pCna/Transitional results Frameworks (TrF). 
The pCna/TrF guidelines note that political and 
security issues should be “treated as an integral 
part of the national planning and budgetary 
process, rather than through separate fora 
which may lead to a lack of transparency or the 
taking of decisions which are unfunded, fiscally 
unsustainable or undermine other reconstruction 
elements.”14  Whether led by government, the 
Un, or IFIs, these assessments seek to bring 
government and external actors together to agree 
on a common set of principles and priorities. 
Ideally, the needs assessment includes an inception 
13 asian Development Bank, UnaMa, UnDp,  World Bank, Securing 
Afghanistan’s Future, March 2004, p. 79.
14 United nations Development Group/World Bank, “Joint Guidance note 
on Integrated recovery planning using post Conflict needs assessments and 
Transitional results Frameworks,” Working Draft for Circulation, September 2007, 
p. 14
all too often, force establishment 
decisions gain political buy-
in prior to any assessment of the 
implications of their costs.
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phase of dialogue with the whole-of-government,15 
followed by a specific SSr assessment. as many 
of these issues are extremely political, fostering 
a supportive environment is vital to managing 
the process of change. The inception phase 
should support contextual understanding of key 
problems and needs, with the SSr assessment then 
identifying strategic interventions to reform the 
form, function, and financing arrangements across 
the sector. Including the security sector in initial 
needs assessments is a powerful statement of 
intent on the part of donors: it acknowledges the 
need to mainstream SSr into wider development 
strategies, and not treat the sector as “stand-alone.” 
a well-timed SSr assessment would be a useful 
tool to recalibrate force sizes to fiscal issues. This 
process could also help identify where and how 
trust funds might be established and aligned to the 
national budgetary process. 
In the early post-conflict period, IFIs are well 
placed to conduct quick fiscal analysis to determine 
the likely size and trajectory of the domestic 
revenue base. While IFIs traditionally have not 
engaged with the security sector, the World Bank’s 
decision to conduct an expenditure review of the 
security sector in afghanistan demonstrated their 
potential to play a valuable role. The argument the 
articles of agreement of the World Bank restrict 
support in this area was usefully re-interpreted 
in this instance, providing a precedent for future 
engagement on the financial dimensions of SSr. 
IFIs should help to develop provisional post-
conflict macro-fiscal forecasts based on available 
information or pre-conflict analysis. While conflict 
often leads to contraction of the formal taxable 
economy, informed estimates of both the overall 
fiscal envelope and the likely envelope for the 
security sector would assist planners in making 
decisions early on in the reform process, while also 
informing decisions related to the establishment 
of trust funds. This information would permit 
more realistic decisions about pay, grading and 
force size. Implicit in right-financing, therefore, is 
removing the shroud of secrecy that often cloaks 
security spending.
15 a number of whole-of-government exercises have been established to 
enhance the alignment of civilian and military forms to international assistance 
(UK pCU, US State/CrS, Germany, etc.).
PROPOSAl 2: AlIGN SHORT-RUN SECURITY 
POlICY PRIORITIES AND SPENDING 
DECISIONS WITH lONG-TERM NATIONAl 
bUDGETARY AND POlITICAl REAlITIES
SSr assessment must consider the short, medium, 
and long-term security and fiscal impacts of 
different force sizes, functions, and pay and 
grading options. above all, international actors and 
their counterparts in national government need to 
pay more attention to the medium- to long-term 
fiscal consequences of short-term restructuring 
decisions. 
political realities in fragile states pose a 
considerable challenge for doing so. at present, 
such decisions are often made on the basis of 
national governments concerned about protecting 
their authority, rather than their people, or 
by international donors concerned about 
international security. In transitional governments, 
powerful political figures often control defense 
and law and order institutions, enabling them to 
obstruct reform efforts based on fiscal priorities 
and a realistic security threat assessment that 
might undermine their personal authority. 
right-financing argues that the budget ought to 
be the primary tool of policy – and that security 
threat assessment should be funded in a balanced 
and fiscally sensitive manner. The costs of running 
the afghan national army, for instance, remain far 
beyond the capacities of state, with on-budget 
security expenditures totaling 485 percent of 
domestic revenue collection in 2005/2006.16  In 
Sierra leone, UK-led reform of the military and 
law enforcement sectors likewise created an army 
and a police that the state cannot easily afford.17 
In the short to medium term, special trust funds 
established by donors can support payment of 
police or military staff where state revenues 
remain wholly insufficient. But such arrangements 
16 World Bank, Afghanistan: Managing Public Finances for Development. 
Volume V: Improving Public Finance Management in the Security Sector. 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank, report no. 34582-aF, December 22, 2005.
17 adrian horn, Funmi olonisakin and Gordon peake ‘UK-led SSr in Sierra 
leone’ in Gordon peake, eric Scheye and alice hills, eds., Managing Insecurity: 
Field Experiences of Security Sector Reform (london: Taylor and Francis 2007).
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should include clear “exit strategies” for an orderly 
transition to a normal budgetary process. 
In assessing security needs, a key question 
guiding national policy must be, “security for 
whom?” Whether the security sector is oriented 
towards ensuring the safety of citizens, protecting 
the power of ruling elites, or shielding the 
international community from terrorism has 
direct implications for how priorities, targets, and 
financing mechanisms are determined. Based on 
a realistic fiscal estimate for the entire security 
sector, attention should be given to: (i) conducting 
a pay and grading review to determine market 
comparative wage scales; and (ii) right-sizing the 
army, police, justice and penal systems as one 
unified process rather than four distinct ones.
The sustainability of SSr also hinges on that oft-
repeated mantra, local ownership. It is clear that 
the SSr process needs to involve a strong civilian 
element and should focus not just on the quantity 
of security services, but their quality as well. 
Where civilian perceptions of security have taken 
a greater role in defining priorities for reform – as, 
for example, in Sierra leone – national security 
is often not identified as the biggest threat. This 
suggests that strengthening civilian oversight 
should not take a back seat to building up the 
operational capacity of security forces. The size, 
structure, and function of the security and justice 
sectors ought to be transformed based on demand, 
rather than simply supply.
In a world in which inter-state wars are diminishing 
in number, and where, as in africa, national armies 
have been notoriously detrimental for peace and 
development, there may be good reasons for nations 
not to have a standing army. a corollary question is 
whether a well-trained and well-managed national 
police service – with the appropriate border and 
custom units – might serve as a viable substitute. 
In Central america, Costa rica abolished its 
military in 1948, demonstrating since that time 
that sovereignty and statehood need not require 
armed forces. Taking this one argument one step 
further, we can consider the implications of the 
fact that non-state systems are the main providers 
of security and justice for some 80-90 percent of 
the population of post-conflict and other fragile 
states.18  In many cases, such non-state systems are 
more effective, accessible, legitimate, and cheaper 
than the formal security sector. In certain contexts, 
such institutions might serve as viable alternatives 
to the state, or at least as interim providers pending 
the build-up of formal institutions.
PROPOSAl 3: MOvE TO A SERvICE DElIvERY 
MODEl FOR THE SECURITY SECTOR
a critical step in developing an appropriate, 
affordable security sector is to cost and prioritize 
investments for the army, police, justice and 
penal institutions. Service delivery benchmarks 
are commonly set for sectors such as health and 
transport, but all too often not for the security 
sector. here, measurement is poor, if not altogether 
absent. one result is a lack of certainty as to what 
reform activities are actually being conducted, how 
they are implemented, what is being achieved, and 
whether the reforms are effective or not. In most 
cases there are no reliable, valid metrics to discern 
whether progress is being made towards building 
capable, efficient, and institutionally robust police 
apparatuses, nor to assess the performance of those 
trying to achieve this. The metrics that are relied 
upon instead are less than meaningful because they 
measure outputs rather than outcomes. “numbers 
trained” is the most frequently used indicator of 
progress, but this is at best a poor guide to either 
quality or capability. In afghanistan, for example, 
we know the numbers of national police and 
soldiers trained; less is known about the impact 
of this hastily trained (and frequently unvetted) 
assemblage in providing security.19 
18  oeCD, “enhancing the Delivery of Justice and Security: Governance, peace, 
and Security,” (paris: oeCD, 2007). “non-state systems” refer to all traditional, 
customary, religious, and informal mechanisms that operate alongside formal state 
institutions and exercise some form of authority for provision of security and 
justice. They include traditional courts, tribal militias, community watch groups, 
village elder councils, political party security, and private security companies.
19 Seth G. Jones, andrew rathmell Jeremy M. Wilson & K. Jack riley, 
Establishing Law and Order After Conflict, (Washington, DC: ranD, 2005.)
Strengthening civilian oversight should 
not  take a back seat to building up the  
operational capacity of security forces.
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policy innovations that are needed to address this 
fundamental weakness include (i) collaboration 
among multilateral and bilateral actors to establish 
model service delivery benchmarks for defense, 
police, justice and penal systems that can be used 
in the SSr review process; (ii) developing standard 
unit costs for services delivered in a given context; 
and (iii) integrating these benchmarks into annual 
budget formulation exercises and medium-
term expenditure frameworks. The benchmarks 
should reflect the transition of security sector 
from an emphasis on combating “enemies of 
the state,” towards providing law and order and 
justice services to citizens. once service delivery 
benchmarks have been set, and based on the 
provisional unit costs, external donor support may 
be required while meeting fundamental public 
finance principles of affordability, discipline, and 
predictability.
PROPOSAl 4: STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAl 
CAPACITIES TO SUPPORT RIGHT-FINANCING
The ability of international actors to support SSr 
generally, and right-financing specifically, faces two 
challenges, coherence and capacity:
•	Coherence:  When the external institutions 
involved behave in an un-strategic, 
uncoordinated manner, the already complex 
process of reform becomes virtually intractable. 
In afghanistan, for example, five lead nations 
were charged with developing security policy in 
each of five SSr “pillars”: DDr (Japan), building 
the afghan national army (USa), training the 
police (Germany), legal reform (Italy), and 
counter-narcotics (the United Kingdom). The 
five were embarrassingly uncoordinated: each 
lead nation pursued its own vision of reform 
with little concern for how the government 
would bear the associated recurrent financial 
costs, or for how reforms within sub-sectors 
linked up across the sector as a whole. Key 
dimensions, like intelligence reform, were 
left out of SSr altogether. The result was the 
antithesis of the unified strategy advocated 
above. right-financing cannot be adopted by 
individual agencies acting alone; it requires 
cooperation among multilateral and bilateral 
donors. We are not naïve as to the challenges of 
finding concordance between institutions. But 
neither are we naïve as to the price of failing to 
address these challenges. 
•	Capacity: reform is fundamentally about 
building institutions. For this reason, the 
personnel recruited to execute programs need 
to possess the requisite expertise in capacity 
building, management, and institutional 
development. The needs involve not only 
professional police-work and soldiery, but 
also staff versed in financial management – 
accountants, auditors, bookkeepers, and office 
managers.20  But just because one is (or was) a 
member of an institution in one country does 
not necessarily make one capable of reforming 
the same institution in another. Building the 
capacity of security institutions requires 
qualified personnel and capacities within 
the donors and implementing organizations 
themselves. In other words, good capacity 
building needs to begin at home.
The first phase of external assistance for SSr is 
assessment. In spite of the fact that the international 
community regularly supports “reconstruction 
needs assessments” in post-conflict countries, 
there is no universally prescribed methodology for 
doing so, nor is there a specialized institution with 
a pool of expertise to undertake such assessments. 
The needs assessments often are followed by 
poorly sequenced external assistance, provided 
before the capacities of budgetary institutions have 
been established. This leads to the “projectization” 
of the national budget, the emergence of parallel 
delivery systems, and a second civil service – the 
aid community.
20 eric Scheye, “Transitions to local authority” in renata Dwan, ed., Executive 
Policing: Enforcing the Law in Peace Operations (oxford: oxford University 
press, 2003).
“numbers trained” is at best a poor 
guide to either quality or capability.
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To strengthen needs assessments in general, and 
the assessment of security systems in particular, 
policy makers should consider establishing a pool 
of expertise across international organizations 
(e.g., the Un, IFIs, the european Union, naTo, 
and the african Union) and bilaterals. This pool 
should include fiscal, public finance, public sector 
restructuring, aid management, and revenue 
experts. policy makers should also assess how 
international support can prime the pump for 
revenue mobilization.21 The needs assessment 
methodology could consider the potential role of 
the security sector in addressing revenue issues, 
including the need for measures to limit the risks 
of non-state capture of state revenues. 
once needs assessments are completed, security 
sector assistance programs need to be planned 
and implemented. The manner in which such 
programs are designed and managed frequently 
militate against the achievement of intended 
goals every bit as much as the difficult, contested, 
environs in which they take place. For example, 
during the Un transitional administration for 
east Timor, of an approved complement of 1,250 
CIVpol (international civilian police) personnel, 
only two posts were allocated to institutional and 
organizational police service development. 22
To strengthen SSr implementation, policy makers 
should: (i) actively promote the migration of public 
sector restructuring experts, including those 
focused on administrative and civil service reform, 
as well as public finance management (pFM) 
experts, to build the capabilities of the civilian parts 
of the ministries of defense, interior and policing 
entities; (ii) conduct a multi-agency assessment of 
the comparative advantages of different Un, IFI 
and bilateral agencies to support SSr; (iii) develop 
support operations to strengthen the role of 
ministries of finance in budgetary process towards 
the security sector, including its involvement in 
21 See the paper in this series by Michael Carnahan, “options for revenue 
Generation in post-Conflict environments,” (november 2007).
22 ludovic hood ‘Missed opportunities: The United nations, police Service and 
Defence Force Development in Timor-leste, 1999–2004’ in Gordon peake, eric 
Scheye and alice hills, eds., Managing Insecurity: Field Experiences of Security 
Sector Reform, (london: Taylor and Francis 2007), p.152
national security council and coordination fora; and 
(iv) mainstream procurement arrangements for the 
sector to maximize efficiency and accountability 
and to minimize corruption.
Finally, the international community needs to 
establish a performance-based, outcome-oriented 
monitoring and evaluation framework for SSr 
programming. assessing the impact of public 
spending on security has been almost impossible 
in post-conflict states. Moreover, in the absence of 
performance-based indicators of enhanced equity 
and quality in service delivery, key issues related 
to horizontal equity – ensuring that security 
coverage is not biased towards certain groups, 
and that employment opportunities within the 
security services are equitably distributed - have 
been routinely neglected. To support movement 
towards a service delivery model for the security 
sector, we recommend that (i) the oeCD/DaC, 
in collaboration with the Un and IFIs, work to 
establish a standard set of objectively verifiable 
indicators and means of verification; and (ii) 
multilateral and bilateral donors support the 
development of information management and 
public expenditure tracking systems within 
national defense and policing institutions.  
The aim is to build responsive 
security capacities without forcing 
governments into a fiscal abyss 
and mortgaging their future.
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CONClUSION
The proposals advanced here are intended to 
improve the quantity, quality, and sustainability 
of security services, benefiting the international 
community and their taxpayers, as well as 
recipient governments and most importantly 
their citizens. as post-conflict states struggle to 
gain traction towards creating a virtuous cycle, 
in which security promotes economic growth 
and political stability, and vice versa, issues of 
scale, prioritization, effectiveness and efficiency 
become fundamental to the delivery of security 
services. The challenge is not to choose between 
fiscal and macro-economic insecurity on one side 
or the underprovision of physical security on the 
other, but to strike an acceptable balance. The aim 
is to build responsive security capacities without 
forcing the governments into a fiscal abyss and 
mortgaging their future. If sustainable solutions 
are to be found for the problems of statebuilding, 
right-financing the security sector is a necessity.

